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1. Introduction
What defines analytic philosophy, viewed as 
a historical phenomenon?  In other words, 
echoing Gilbert Ryle, what is “the story” of 
analytic philosophy, or, what is its “preoc-
cupation” or even “occupational disease”? 
This is the question I will try to answer.  I 
will maintain that Ryle’s characterization of 
analytic philosophy in terms of the “preoc-
cupation with . . . meaning” (1957, 239) is 
correct, with some qualifications, and that 
philosophy naturalized is an exit from ana-
lytic philosophy that leaves analytic philoso-
phy in a crisis.  However, I suggest that there 
is still important work left to do for analytic 
philosophy, work that reclaims its identity 
and continues its project of understanding 
meaning.
2. Characterizing Analytic Philosophy
A challenge to any attempt to characterize 
analytic philosophy is that it does not have 
a unifying doctrine or set of doctrines.  It 
is tempting to conclude from this that it 
only consists of “overlapping strands, with 
no usefully defining fibre or fibres running 
through its whole temporal length” (Hacker 
1996, 4), a “family resemblance” (Stroll 
2000, 7), or even that it is only “a trail of 
influence” (Soames 2003, 1:xiii).  This sug-
gests that the best we can do to character-
ize analytic philosophy is to find a starting 
point – typically a set of philosophers, such 
as Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and perhaps 
Frege with a unifying agenda – but whatever 
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it is that unifies this starting point is wholly transformed and even dropped by succeeding 
generations, who themselves begin their own agendas that are equally overcome, and so 
on.
This suggestion is helpful only if we are able to individuate some unifying features of the 
starting agenda and then also identify some principles that allow us to trace the proper trails 
of influence.  After all, in addition to the trails that remain within the territory of analytic 
philosophy, there are trails that lead out of it.  For example, there is a trail that leads from 
Frege to Husserl and there is a trail that leads from Austin to Derrida (Derrida 1988, 38 and 
130-1).  If we are trying to determine the historical identity of analytic philosophy, we need 
to understand why some trails keep us in and others take us out of the analytic tradition.  
This can be done in one of two ways.  Appropriate trails of influence can be individuated 
intensionally, that is in terms of some overlapping concepts and attitudes that define the 
appropriate trails of influence.  Or, defining content can be ignored and instead we can trace 
a history of reception and succession in terms of tutors, teachers, students, departments, 
institutes, journals, books, textbooks, and so forth.  The latter would be a naturalized, em-
pirical, and social scientific history of analytic philosophy.  Hacker in Wittgenstein’s Place 
in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy offers several brief but fascinating and enlight-
ening sketches of such lines of influence (Hacker 1996, 148-182). 
Hacker, however, is an exception.  Analytic philosophers typically are not interested in 
such naturalistic histories of their own philosophy.  Accordingly, my strategy will be inten-
sional, that is, I aim to identify, in Soames’ words, the “underlying themes or tendencies 
that characterize” analytic philosophy (Soames 2003, 1:xiii).  Even if there are no unifying 
doctrines, there may be a set of concepts and attitudes that characterize analytic philoso-
phy and distinguish it from other kinds of philosophy.  I hope to characterize this content 
without begging the question, and in such a way that non-analytic philosophers might find 
my characterization instructive.  Accordingly, I aim to avoid tendentious or ‘churchy’ char-
acterizations, for example that analytic philosophy is defined by a commitment to “clarity, 
rigor, and argumentation” and that it aims at “truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral or 
spiritual improvement” (Soames 2003, 1:xiv). 
3. Ryle’s Thesis
My point of departure is Ryle’s characterization of analytic philosophy in 1956 in his intro-
duction to the publication of a series of eight lectures from BBC’s Third Programme with 
the title The Revolution in Philosophy.  An aim of this collection, Ryle writes, is to “trace 
our proximate origins” and to let the essays in this collection be like “memoirs” that “sup-
ply the future historian with those considered and marshalled reminiscences which they 
will need” (Ryle 1956, 1). This is exactly how I want to use this collection.
In this introduction Ryle distinguishes between “the vehicle and what it conveys,” where 
vehicles are meaningful psychological or linguistic entities, and what they convey is their 
sense or meaning.  It is in virtue of their meaning that the vehicles are “capable of being 
true or false...and capable of implying and being incompatible with other judgments.”  Ryle 
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then characterizes analytic philosophy in its roughly first fifty years as “very largely the 
story of this notion of sense or meaning” (Ryle 1956, 8).  This claim is echoed in 1957 in 
his essay “The Theory of Meaning,” namely that the question “What are meanings?” has 
“bulked large in philosophical and logical discussions,” and that “preoccupation with the 
theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century 
Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy” (Ryle 1957, 239).
Some clarifications and corrections are in order.  First, Ryle does not intend to narrow 
the focus of analytic philosophy to what Frege isolates as “sense” or “Sinn” in contrast to 
“reference” or “Bedeutung”.  Frege’s technical notions of sense and reference are part of 
his own analysis or distillation of meaning, that is, in Michael Beaney’s useful phrase, his 
“splitting of content” into two components (Beaney 1996, 151-2).   This distillation is only 
one answer, albeit a very fruitful and influential one, to the question “What are meanings?” 
and of course there are others.
Second, for Ryle it is essential that the vehicles are psychological entities, but meanings are 
not:  instead they are abstract objects that belong to the domain of logic and philosophy. 
While the rejection of psychologism certainly defines early analytic philosophy, I do not 
believe that this is a necessary condition of analytic philosophy.  As in the case of Fregean 
senses, anti-psychologism is just one strategy for answering the question “What are mean-
ings?”  It is preoccupation with this question that first and foremost characterizes analytic 
philosophy, not a particular answer.
Third, while Ryle’s regional, national or linguistic references to Anglo-Saxon and Austrian 
philosophy might be useful as a rough and ready way to fix the referent of “analytic philos-
ophy”, these references include and also exclude too much.  Austrian philosophy, strictly 
speaking, also includes Husserl, Hayek and Adler, none of whom are analytic philosophers. 
Moreover, Reichenbach, Hempel and Tarski were neither Austrian nor Anglo-Saxon.  They 
were anglophone in that they spoke and wrote English, but English was not their native 
language and their early works that are already constitutive of analytic philosophy are not 
in English.
Fourth, Ryle is characterizing a major and perhaps even dominant trend of twentieth-cen-
tury philosophy, but it certainly does not characterize all of twentieth-century philosophy. 
If we substitute “analytic philosophy” for “twentieth-century philosophy” or “ twentieth-
century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy,” Ryle’s thesis properly cleaned-up is that 
the history of analytic philosophy is ‘the story of this notion of sense or meaning’ and the 
‘preoccupation with meaning is the occupational disease of analytic philosophy’.
Fifth, while the publication of this collection coincides with what might be called the 
“second wave” of analytic philosophy or what is sometimes labeled “ordinary language 
philosophy” and some of the essays aim to locate this wave within the analytic tradition, 
it is a serious error to see this collection as a mere “manifesto” of ordinary language phi-
losophy, and to assume that the revolution mentioned in its title refers to this second wave 
(Wright 1994, 16).  Certainly this was not the intent of this collection, which aims to cover 
a movement that includes Frege, Russell, Moore, both late and early Wittgenstein, as well 
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the Vienna Circle.  The collection does include an essay by Strawson that places particu-
lar emphasis on the significance of ordinary language philosophy.  He characterizes two 
contrasting “courses”, one a course of construction that he ties to the work of Carnap and 
Quine and the other a course of analysis that he ties to Austin and Ryle.1  However, Straw-
son considered both trends as live options in analytic philosophy, and both, on his account, 
were devoted to the analysis of sentences and propositions (Strawson 1956, 100-1).
Finally and perhaps most importantly, Ryle suggests that there is a line between analytic 
philosophy and “the technical or semi-technical ideas” of the “new Formal Logic.”  Ryle 
writes that these ideas “were taken over by philosophers for the solution of their own 
problems,” but he separates the philosophers’ problems from those of the formal logicians 
(Ryle 1956, 9).  This line of separation is also traced by Soames in his 2 volume history 
of analytic philosophy, which, by his own admission, treats the formal work of Frege and 
Tarski, among others, “rather sparingly” (Soames 2003, 1:xvii).  For example, there are no 
individual chapters devoted to Frege, Tarski or Carnap.  There are good practical reasons 
for this separation, but it must be underscored that this work in logic is not incidental or 
merely parallel to the development of analytic philosophy.  This work is at its very core, as 
is evident from the fact that advanced formal logic and even set theory were requirements 
in analytic graduate programs.
The reason for this is that analytic philosophy’s concept of meaning is the concept of some-
thing essentially constrained by truth-preserving inferential relationships between proposi-
tions.  Ryle himself assumes this when he writes that it is in virtue of meaning that vehi-
cles of meaning are “capable of implying and being incompatible with other judgments” 
(Ryle 1956, 8).  Here Ryle is simply following Frege, who in his groundbreaking work 
on logic, the Begriffsschrift, identifies “conceptual content” in terms of logical inference, 
specifically deductive validity.  For analytic philosophers, truth-preserving inferences and 
equivalences are essential to meaning, and hence a core feature of this preoccupation with 
meaning.2 
Analytic philosophy’s inferential conception of meaning is an important reason why Hus-
serl is not a canonical figure in the history of analytic philosophy.  While Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations discuss, as the title indicates, logical issues, this is not a work on logic as 
Frege understood it, and it does not look like a book on logic or the philosophy of logic 
from our vantage point either.  Frege’s letter to Husserl written October 30, 1906 concern-
ing logic explains this difference very clearly:
In logic one must be determined to regard equipollent sentences as differing only 
according to their form.  After the assertoric force with which they have been ut-
tered is subtracted, equipollent sentences have something in common in their con-
tent, and this is what I call the proposition they express.  This is the only thing that 
concerns logic.  (Frege 1976, 101-3)
1 He also calls one the "American School" and the other the "English School" (Strawson 
1956, 101).
2 This leaves completely open the question about the appropriate type of this logic.
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This common content, or what in the Begriffsschrift he calls the “conceptual content” con-
sists only of that “which affects the possible inferences” (Frege 1879, 3; also iv).  Logic 
is concerned only with “whatever is needed for a valid [that is, truth-preserving] infer-
ence” (ibid.).  While for Frege conceptual content is “the only thing that concerns logic,” 
in Husserl’s Logical Investigations this is at best a very peripheral topic.  Central to the 
Logical Investigations is an attempt to give a theory of intentional objects and contents 
that play a role in knowledge and experience, as suggested by the subtitle of the massive 
second volume:  “Investigation of of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge” (Hus-
serl 1992, vol. 3, 3).  Accordingly, Husserl’s notion of meaning is from the very start not 
constrained by inferential relationships, but instead by the contents of intentional objects 
that are subject to an “immanent description” of these psychic acts on the basis of reflec-
tion.  This will include a theory of abstraction, attention, intentionality, among other things. 
Similarly, Husserl’s Formale und Transzendentale Logik discusses the concept of truth as 
an epistemic and phenomenological category, not in terms of truth-preserving relationships 
(Husserl 1992, vol. 7, 46-8).3
With these five provisos in mind, I take for granted that Ryle’s characterization captures 
the first fifty years.  Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, as well as the members of the 
Vienna Circle were all preoccupied with meaning.  Just to illustrate this with a simple in-
stance, consider that Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic is entirely devoted to meaning.  In 
the very first sentence Frege raises the question “what the symbol 1 means” (Frege 1978, i) 
and in the concluding paragraph he declares that the foundational problems of arithmetic, 
including the treatment of positive whole numbers as well as the difficulties of fractions 
and negative and irrational numbers are “just . . . a matter of fixing the content of a . . . 
judgment.” (Frege 1978, 119).  
What I wish to do here is make a case that this characterization holds for the second fifty 
years as well, by focusing on the two towering figures of this period:  Rawls and Kripke. 
They are particularly interesting for my purposes because while they are defining fixtures 
in the history of analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, their work 
also motivated important new directions in philosophy that constitute a break with the past 
that, I will argue, constitute a departure from the analytic tradition.4 
4. Rawls
I focus on Rawls’ discussion of civil disobedience because it is a microcosm of his theory 
of justice and at the same time it is arguably an essay that plays a role in the emergence of 
applied ethics, which has an ambiguous status for many analytic philosophers.
The very title of this discussion highlights Rawls’ preoccupation with meaning:  “The
3 I thank Sandra LaPointe for challenging me on excluding Husserl from analytic philosophy.
4 It is useful to distinguish analytical philosophy from analytic philosophy.  The term “ana-
lytical philosophy” casts a much wider net than the term “analytic philosophy,” a net that catches 
philosophers such as Husserl, who are analytical, but not part of the canon of analytic philosophers. 
However, the term “analytical philosophy” is an evolution from the narrower conception of analytic 
philosophy, and hence it is important to understand the narrower conception first.
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Definition of Civil Disobedience” (Rawls 1971, 363).  With this definition Rawls aims to, 
in his words, “illustrate the content of the principles of natural duty and obligation.”  His 
discussion of civil disobedience has two major components.  The first is a definition of civil 
disobedience as a kind of dissent within the context of a “nearly just society,” which Rawls 
believes conceptually requires a democratic regime.  Accordingly, civil disobedience is 
defined as a certain kind of opposition, namely loyal opposition, to democratic author-
ity.   The details of Rawls’ definition are not relevant here, but suffice it to say that Rawls 
maintains that “civil disobedience has been defined so that it falls between legal protest 
and the raising of test cases on the other side” (Rawls 1971, 367).5   The second component 
of his discussion of civil disobedience is the stating of the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions under which civil disobedience is justified.  Within the confines of traditional analytic 
methodology, this is nothing less than a definition of a subset of civil disobedience, namely 
justified civil disobedience.
Of course, a definition of justified civil disobedience also serves to justify civil disobedi-
ence in those instances that satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of justified civil 
disobedience.  Thus it is tempting to emphasize the justification Rawls offers at the expense 
of the analytic task of defining justification.  This can give a popular but misleading im-
pression that Rawls’ theory of justice is a “revolutionary” departure from earlier analytic 
ethics because it pays “almost no attention to meta-ethics and instead pursued moral argu-
ments directly.”6    But this understanding of Rawls’ project fails to distinguish two distinct 
kinds of justifications.  One assumes a standard of justification and applies it to a certain set 
of cases, arguing that these cases match or satisfy this standard.   The other aims first to of-
fer the definition of a standard, and then sets out to offer the justification.  Rawls’ argument 
falls into the second category, and while Rawls’ work does depart from his predecessors 
in terms of emphasis and inspires a new wave of work in ethics, his work does not depart 
from analytic philosophy’s preoccupation with meaning.
Accordingly, Rawls offers three “conditions” for justified civil disobedience (Rawls 1971, 
371).  First, an act of justified civil disobedience is addressed to substantial and clear viola-
tions of the principles of justice that define justice as fairness (Rawls 1971, 372).  Second, 
“the legal means of redress have proved of no avail,” and finally, the acts of civil disobedi-
ence do not threaten the breakdown of the nearly just society (Rawls 1971, 373-4).  It is 
worth noting how Rawls argues for this third condition.  He considers cases that are, in his 
words, “conceivable...even if...unlikely” that there are many groups that satisfy the first 
two conditions, so many that their acts of civil disobedience would lead to serious disorder 
that threatens the just constitution.  In other words, in accordance with the analytic pursuit 
of a definition, Rawls considers logically possible scenarios to tighten his definition of 
justified civil disobedience (Rawls 1971, 374).
The case of Rawls’ analytic discussion of civil disobedience mirrors his overall project of 
5 It should also be noted that Rawls acknowledges that he gives a “narrower definition to 
civil disobedience” because he distinguishes it from what he calls “conscientious refusal,” which he 
also aims to define (Rawls 1971, 368).
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics Accessed March 31, 2012. and http://www.
academicroom.com/topics/normative-ethics  Accessed April 13, 2014
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offering a theory of justice.  Rawls maintains that “the concept of justice...[is] defined...
by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate 
division of social advantages” (Rawls 1971, 10).  The problem is that there are differ-
ent interpretations of this role – competing principles for assigning rights and duties, and 
distributing social advantages.  These different interpretations are alternative conceptions 
of justice, and Rawls’ primary task is to offer a conception of justice as fairness as a “vi-
able alternative” to then dominant conceptions, particularly utilitarian conceptions (Rawls 
1971, 3).   The demonstration of viability rests on a justification that rational individuals in 
the original position would choose the principles of the conception of justice as fairness. 
This is not intended to be a psychological claim.   Rawls intends it to be the conclusion of 
a “strictly deductive” argument (Rawls 1971, 119 and 121) that follows from, among other 
things, certain propositions about what it means to be rational, which entail as a matter 
of meaning  that rational individuals would make certain choices given certain epistemic 
states.  While Rawls admits that he falls short of this analytic goal, it is nevertheless the 
pursuit of this goal that drives Rawls’ justification of justice as fairness.
As indicated above, it is possible to abstract from the analytic component of Rawls’ theory 
of justice and isolate a normative argument, for instance an argument for civil disobedi-
ence.  This sort of abstraction inspired the development of applied ethics, that is, the project 
of using normative principles to argue for specific courses of action on important social and 
personal issues.  However, minus the analytic preoccupation with meaning, this work ceas-
es to be in the analytic tradition, and this is why much work in applied ethics strikes many 
readers as a “revolutionary” development in philosophy.  In order to be a work in analytic 
philosophy, it has to be concerned with meaning.   Applied philosophy that satisfies this 
criterion (for example, work on the concept of intrinsic value, in the case of environmental 
ethics, or on the concept of pain in bioethics) falls within the scope of analytic philosophy.
5. Kripke
Kripke is the other towering figure in the history of analytic philosophy of the second 
half of the twentieth century.  Soames, for example, writes that “the two most important 
achievements that have emerged from the analytic tradition in this period [1900-1975] are 
(i) the recognition that philosophical speculation must be grounded in pre-philosophical 
thought, and (ii) the success achieved in understanding, and separating one from another, 
the fundamental methodological notions of logical consequence, logical truth, necessary 
truth, and a priori truth” (Soames 2003, 1:xi).  I have doubts about the first claim and I think 
these two claims are actually incompatible, a case I wish I had time to make.  Be that as it 
may, certainly the second claim is true insofar as it characterizes an important set of influ-
ential developments in the analytic tradition in the 1970s, and Kripke’s work on meaning 
and modality is at the center of this development.
The locus classicus for this development is a series of three lectures Kripke gave in 1970 
and that were first published in 1972 and then republished in 1980 in the form of a book 
under the title Naming and Necessity.  These lectures begin with a massive critique of de-
scriptive theories of the meaning and reference of proper names that is now a canonical part 
of analytic philosophy, but the background of this critique is equally important.  As Kripke 
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notes in his Preface to the 1980 edition, these lectures grew out of his groundbreaking 
model theoretic semantics for modal logic (Kripke 1980, 3), and this is another example of 
how formal studies are at the very core of developments in analytic philosophy.  
Kripke’s model-theoretic or possible worlds semantics of modal operators led to questions 
about how to interpret the terms of identity statements, especially ones that appeared to be 
contingent identity statements, such as that Aristotle is identical to the tutor of Alexander. 
If there can be contingent identities, then identities are not necessary, and Kripke held 
that as a matter of logic identical objects are necessarily identical (Kripke 1980, 3-4).  To 
clear-up the appearance of contingent identities, Kripke introduced the technical notion of 
a rigid designator, namely a term that designates the same object across all possible worlds 
in which it exists.  In 1963-64 Kripke began to apply this concept to proper names in natu-
ral languages, and this move allowed Kripke to decouple the meanings of proper names 
from descriptions.  Once descriptions were expelled from their meanings, it was natural to 
question whether descriptions are even needed to fix the reference of proper names.  If not, 
then names can succeed in referring directly without some intervening descriptive content. 
Moreover, the content or semantic contribution a name makes to the meaning of a sentence 
can be limited to its referent.  These theses about the meanings of proper names were also 
extended to natural kind terms, separating the content of natural kind terms from the de-
scriptive content of our beliefs and theories about those kinds.
As already indicated, these new theories of meaning for proper names and natural kind 
terms motivated important revisions in a wide range of areas of philosophy.  A received 
view was that a priori knowledge rests on what can be known on the basis of reflection on 
the descriptive contents of our concepts, and that necessary truths rest on these descriptive 
contents knowable a priori. But if we assume that the terms “water” and “H20” both func-
tion as rigid designators and that identical things are necessarily identical, then it is neces-
sary that water is identical to H20, but this is known a posteriori, not a priori.  The traditional 
view that Ruth Millikan calls “Meaning Rationalism” (Millikan 1984, 10),  namely that we 
know a priori, simply relying on Cartesian reflection, what we are thinking and intending to 
do when speaking or writing also suffered a setback.  If we are thinking, speaking or writ-
ing with rigid designators, whose meanings “just ain’t in the head,” as Putnam famously 
puts it, then meaning rationalism appears to be false (Putnam 1975, 227).  In short, rigid 
designators ushered in various forms of externalism according to which meaning was not 
at all or at least not entirely determined by the content internal to us.
6. Consequences
Beneficiaries of these changes in analytic philosophy’s conception of meaning were real-
ism and naturalism, particularly in the philosophy of science and ethics.  However, a closer 
look at this development also reveals an exit from analytic philosophy that is the source of 
what has been characterized as an identity crisis (Wright 1994, 4).7   The fate of Moore’s 
Open Question argument in recent philosophy is a case in point. To simplify, Moore argued 
that the property of being good cannot be identical to a natural property, say, to use Moore’s 
7 Reference to a crisis in analytic philosophy are not uncommon:  Baz  (2014),  Glock (2008, 
1), Preston (2007, 7), Preston (2005, 294), Leiter (2004, 1), and Biletzky and Matar (1998, xi).
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example, the desire to desire.  The reason is that the question “Is it good to desire to de-
sire?” is intelligible and asks for new information.  It is not equivalent to the trivial question 
“Is the good good?”.   Moore also puts his case in another way:  the mere fact that we can 
doubt that the desire to desire is good “shews clearly that we have two different notions be-
fore our minds” (Moore 2005, 16).  This way of putting Moore’s argument is particularly 
significant because it rests on the same principle Frege used in the opening paragraph of 
“Sense and Reference” regarding identity statements and that Gareth Evans called the “In-
tuitive Criterion of Difference” (Evans 1982, 19). Two sentences have distinct meanings if 
a competent speaker understands both but without being incoherent or irrational can affirm 
one while deny or remain agnostic about the other.  More broadly, what Moore and Frege 
assumed is that in assigning meaning to a person’s linguistic or mental states, we must take 
into account differences in their cognitive attitudes.  I will call this “Frege’s Constraint” 
(following White 2004, 213).
The canonical naturalist reply is to deny that the cognitive differences that play a role in 
Moore’s argument are relevant to the individuation of properties.  In Brink’s terms, for 
example, the “Semantic Test for Properties” fails, and part of the reason is that terms or 
predicates can succeed in referring or denoting something without satisfying any of the 
cognitive content a person has in mind while using the term (Brink 1989, 163-6; 2001, 
154-76).  Just as the terms “water” and “H20” can be associated with cognitive differences 
(a person can rationally wonder if water is indeed H20 while water and H20 are as identi-
cal), “good” and some naturalistic term can be co-referential despite cognitive differences. 
What in the end underlies this response is the idea that moral terms can function as rigid 
designators as well as proper names or natural kind terms.
This is an example of how the preoccupation with meaning led to an influential and impor-
tant shift in analytic meta-ethics.  But it also points to a trail that leaves analytic philosophy 
behind once naturalists cease to care about questions of meaning and turn to explanatory 
projects constrained by results from the biological or social sciences at the expense of 
Frege’s constraint.8   
To elaborate, the canonical naturalist reply to Moore’s Open Question Argument is not at 
all a refutation of his argument, but simply a change of topics.  Moore was interested in 
the meaning of “good” and he assumed meaning was subject to Frege’s constraint.  This 
is evident when he writes that his argument “shews clearly that we have two different no-
tions before our minds” (Moore 2005, 16).  He was not concerned with matters of fact – for 
instance, in what kinds of things turn out to be good – but what it is that we understand – 
what is “before our minds” – when we use evaluative terms such as “good”.  Accordingly, 
as Akeel Bilgrami argues, the canonical naturalist reply does not show “that there is any 
fault in Moore’s argument itself” because it remains “effective (and is only intended to be 
effective) against naturalisms that are definitional” (Bilgrami 2004, 129-30).  Even if in 
fact good is identical to some natural property F, it is possible for a person without being 
irrational to doubt or even deny that good is identical to F, and this shows that the concept 
8 I think Richard Boyd's essay "How to Be a Moral Realist" is an exemplar of this departure, 
beginning with a discussion of semantic issues and ending with a ‘just so’ story of empirically 
discoverable homeostatic property clusters.
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of good and the concept of F are distinct.
In effect, a naturalist who is completely satisfied with the canonical naturalist reply and 
with no concern for the relevant cognitive differences ceases to care about meaning subject 
to Frege’s constraint. But the concept of meaning that is essential to analytic philosophy’s 
preoccupation is meaning that not only serves inferential relationships, but that is also 
subject to Frege’s constraint.  Hence, a loss of interest in this concept of meaning is a loss 
of interest in analytic philosophy.
Of course, there is a way to understand this naturalist turn in philosophy as still a kind of 
preoccupation with meaning, except that now “ ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”.  I think 
this move is only a Pyrrhic victory.  Frege’s constraint is now replaced by the results of the 
empirical and special sciences.  Meaning now is assigned not on the basis of how people 
understand what they say and think, but on the basis of what science has to say about what 
people think they understand.  In this sense of meaning, any special science is also con-
cerned with meaning because its results determine what we mean, not what appears before 
our minds.  
This is a Pyrrhic victory because it draws all blood from meaning as a special subject for 
analytic philosophy.  Meanings that are subject only to the constraints of natural science 
leave nothing for analytic philosophy to do except perhaps to correct those who still think 
that philosophy has a special domain.  This also leaves analytic philosophy without a clear 
identity.  Ryle in his introduction to The Revolution in Philosophy maintained that analytic 
philosophy was partially a response to new institutional pressures on philosophers from 
secular colleagues, mostly natural scientists, to identify a domain of expertise and method 
for philosophy (Ryle 1956, 4-5).  Meaning and its analysis was this special domain of 
expertise.  But meaning without Frege’s constraint drains this special domain of expertise, 
and this leaves analytic philosophy in crisis.
7.  The Roots of Crisis
Von Wright suggests a different diagnosis of analytic philosophy’s identity crisis, namely 
that it is caused by pair of competing commitments that can be found at the very roots 
of analytic philosophy (Wright 1994, 3-32).  He explains these commitments in terms 
borrowed from Frederick Waismann’s distinction between science and philosophy in his 
essay “What is Logical Analysis?”  The scientist “searches for knowledge, i.e. proposi-
tions which are true, which agree with reality,” and the highest goal of this attitude is the 
construction of theories about matters of fact, Waismann writes.  Philosophers, in particular 
analytic philosophers, “cannot be satisfied with this” because they find “the very nature of 
knowledge and truth . . . problematic” and are interested in the “deeper meaning of what 
the scientist does”.  Consequently, analytic philosophers aim not at “propositions, but the 
clarification of propositions” (Waismann 1940, 265-6).  While Waismann sets this as a 
line of demarcation between science and philosophy, von Wright argues that both of these 
“attitudes of mind” are found within analytic philosophy, and that these developed into an 
“unbearable contradiction” that “had to destroy its unity” (Wright 1994, 4).
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The philosophies of Moore and Russell, von Wright argues, already are marked by these 
opposing poles.  Russell, von Wright suggests, is motivated by the scientific search for 
true propositions about matters of fact, and this characterizes Russell’s work on mathemat-
ics and logic as well as his work on the problem of induction.  In Our Knowledge of the 
External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy Russell proclaims that “the 
time has now arrived” to correct the “unsatisfactory state” that philosophy “has achieved 
fewer results than any other branch of learning,” and von Wright cites this as the clearest 
expression of Russell’s scientific attitude (Wright 1994, 6-7).  Moore, on the other hand, is 
concerned with meaning.  For example, it is not the truth of commonsense propositions that 
concerns Moore, but the analysis of their meaning (Wright 1994, 7-8).
While I think that von Wright’s diagnosis points in the right direction, first I wish to correct 
some elements of this diagnosis.  First, von Wright’s discussion of Waismann’s distinction 
is misleading.  Waismann’s distinction is not simply between questions of truth and ques-
tions of meaning because from his answer to the question “What is Logical Analysis?” it is 
clear that philosophy also involves the pursuit of true propositions.   Philosophy, Waismann 
maintains, involves the assertion of tautologies, and a tautology, in his words, “expresses 
agreement with all truth-possibilities, i.e., that it is always true,” adding that the truth of 
tautologies (as well as the falsity of contradictions) “no longer depends on the behavior of 
the real world” (Waismann 1940, 268-9).  So Waismann’s distinction is better understood 
as a distinction between different kinds of truths.  Needless to say, this assumes that we can 
draw a distinction between these two domains, and Waismann assumes we can.
This assumption that there is a distinction between different kinds of truths is shared by 
Russell and Moore, although they drew this distinction differently over the courses of their 
careers.  While both began with a Platonist ontology of meanings and Russell departs from 
this commitment in his theory of descriptions, Russell’s turn to logical constructions and 
logical form preserves the commitment to a special domain for philosophy.  Waismann ex-
presses this quite nicely in his account of logical analysis, namely that philosophers aim at 
the “clarification of the sense of . . . propositions,” and they do this by “demonstrating the 
purely logical relations between propositions” (Waismann 1940, 266 and 269).
Second, Russell’s pursuit of scientific philosophy in 1914 in Our Knowledge of the Exter-
nal World and the companion essay “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” does not quite 
fit von Wright’s divide between questions of truth and questions of meaning.  For Russell, 
part of what makes philosophy scientific is his principle of construction.  He writes:  “the 
supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing is this:  Wherever possible, logical construc-
tions are to be substituted for inferential entities” (Russell 1986, 11).  This is the principle 
that guides Russell’s theory of descriptions, which is intended as an analysis of both the 
meaning and denotation of definite descriptions, and when Russell turns to the concepts 
of physics in 1914, he uses this principle to guide his account of the meaning of physical 
terms such as “matter” “object” or “place”.
This principle gives philosophy a certain scientific character that Russell describes quite 
clearly in the essay “On Scientific Method in Philosophy” published as a pamphlet in 1914. 
He distinguishes between philosophy that aims to be scientific by seeking to base itself 
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upon the “results of science” or by adopting the “methods of science”.  Russell maintains 
that “much philosophy inspired by science has gone astray through preoccupation with the 
results momentarily supposed to have been achieved” (Russell 1986, 57).  Russell cites the 
19th-century naturalist Herbert Spencer, but surely this applies to trends in contemporary 
naturalism as well.  For Russell, the appropriate way of making philosophy scientific is to 
transfer “not results, but methods” from “the sphere of the special sciences to the sphere of 
philosophy.”  That is, philosophy for Russell has a special sphere.   According to Russell, 
“philosophy is the science of the possible”, and possibility is studied by enumerating the 
logical forms of propositions and facts, and this is not an empirical investigation (Russell 
1986, 65).
Moreover, the propositions of philosophy “must be a priori”, which for Russell means 
that they are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by empirical evidence because they hold 
“however the actual world were constituted” (1986, 65).  So it is not the appeal to empirical 
evidence or the pursuit of contingent truths that makes philosophy scientific for Russell. 
What makes it scientific is that with a well-defined set of problems and a method, philoso-
phy is in a position to deal “with its problems piecemeal, and . . . obtain, as the sciences 
do . . . partial . . . results  . . . [that] subsequent investigation can utilize even while it sup-
plements and improves them” (Russell 1986, 66).  In other words, philosophy is scientific 
insofar as it is “progressive”, which means that it consists of “successive approximations to 
the truth,” but these are truths about logical form and possibility.  So Russell indeed is con-
cerned with questions of truth, as von Wright observes, but not with truths about empirical 
and contingent matters of fact, but with truths about logical form and possibility.
 
Russell’s increasing interest in psychological matters could be seen as blurring the line 
between Russell and naturalism.  Hylton (1990, 244) argues that after Russell’s Principles 
of Mathematics, published in 1903, Russell begins “to take some interest in questions 
which he might have dismissed as merely psychological.”  Hylton maintains that the fact 
that for Russell after the Principles “philosophical theories . . . appear to be answerable to 
the data of experience, to facts about what is or can be plausibly supposed to be present to 
our minds . . . is clearly a considerable concession to psychologism” (1990, 330).  While 
Hilton is correct about Russell’s increased interest in psychological matters, an appeal to 
psychological facts and psychological plausibility does not constitute a concession to psy-
chologism.  After all, Frege’s appeal to cognitive value or significance [Erkenntniswert] 
and his appeal to the distinction between what can be known a priori and what is a “valu-
able extension of our knowledge” (1980, 40) is a psychological appeal, but it is not a 
concession to psychologism.  Finally, Hylton concedes that “Russell continues to think 
that the subject-matter of philosophy is wholly independent of psychology” (283).  This 
is precisely what Russell delineates in his 1914 discussion of the scientific method in phi-
losophy and that distinguishes Russell from contemporary naturalism.  In general, a turn 
toward psychological facts is not, ipso facto, a naturalistic turn unless these facts, to use 
Russell’s terminology, are results simply transferred from empirical psychology rather than 
facts pertaining to a philosophical psychology that is distinct from empirical psychology.
While von Wright is mistaken that Waismann’s division between science and philosophy 
is a division within the origins of analytic philosophy and a source of its eventual disinte-
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gration, he nevertheless points in the right direction.  In the theory of descriptions, Russell 
applied his maxim “Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for in-
ferred entities” (Russell 1986, 11) against  Frege’s and Meinong’s ontologies of intensional 
entities.  An essential feature of this intensional approach is that it is driven in part by a 
conception of meaning that aims to capture intuitive and cognitive differences in the under-
standing of language.  This, of course, is Frege’s constraint.
Russell’s approach, especially in his theory of descriptions, suggests that in questions of 
meaning, ontological constraints can trump Frege’s constraint.  As Russell repeats several 
times, his analysis is “in obedience to the feeling of reality,” and a “robust sense of reality 
is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions,” even if it comes at a cost 
of “apparently excessive complication,” in particular the familiar complexity of analyzing 
definite descriptions into parts that only make sense in the context of a whole sentence with 
nested quantifiers in which there is no single unit that can be identified as a substitution for 
the definite description (Russell 1919, 48).
It is this weakening of the commitment to Frege’s constraint and letting ontological con-
siderations take its place that are the roots of analytic philosophy’s crisis in the wake of 
Kripke’s work on naming and necessity.  Kripke’s own case against descriptivism is guided 
by Frege’s constraint.  A gloss on one of his arguments is that someone can consistently 
believe that Aristotle is the tutor of Alexander while this is, in Kripke’s words “not a neces-
sary truth for him” (Kripke 1980, 63).  Hence, the meaning of the proper name “Aristotle” 
cannot be identified with the description of him being the tutor of Alexander.  Another 
argument is that a person can have beliefs about Einstein and meaningfully use “Einstein” 
without having any beliefs about him involving definite descriptions; hence a name can be 
meaningful without backing definite descriptions.
However, the irony of Kripke’s achievement is that it prepared the decommission of Frege’s 
constraint and inspired a naturalized philosophy that is no longer preoccupied with mean-
ing constrained by cognitive differences.  Instead, questions concerning matters of fact – 
for example “just-so stories” appealing to (borrowing from Russell) “results momentarily 
supposed to have been achieved,” say, in evolutionary biology – replace questions about 
truths of meaning.  If Ryle is correct that the preoccupation with meaning is essential to 
analytic philosophy and I am right that the relevant notion of meaning is one that is subject 
to Frege’s constraint, then these kinds of philosophical projects, while they might borrow 
some of the standards and methods of analytic philosophy, are not examples of analytic 
philosophy anymore.
8. Conclusion
Stephen White made a trenchant parenthetical comment about the status of Frege’s con-
straint today, namely that “the profession is currently in denial” about it.  Current philo-
sophical theorizing simply ignores Frege’s constraint, White claims, “but not on the basis 
of cogent arguments” (White 2004, 222).  White makes this point regarding current work in 
the philosophy of mind, arguing that a satisfactory account of agency needs to account for 
the “agential perspective,” and that this in turn needs an account of meaning that satisfies 
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Frege’s constraint.  Without Frege’s constraint, the perspective of the agent is ignored, and 
by ignoring this personal perspective, we ignore agency.
I would like to put this point somewhat differently.  Frege’s constraint is ignored on account 
of a major shift in philosophy that was made possible by rigid designators and direct theo-
ries of reference and meaning.  Ignoring Frege’s constraint is an unintended consequence 
and the profession has not come to terms with the fact that this marks a departure from 
previous philosophizing that is at least as dramatic as the inception of analytic philosophy 
itself.  In fact, as I have been arguing, it is a way of doing philosophy that is not analytic 
anymore.  Analytic philosophy is, at its core, preoccupied with meaning, where meaning 
is subject to Frege’s constraint, but contemporary “naturalizing” philosophy is not.9   Ad-
ditionally, insofar as naturalized philosophy now dominates our profession, replacing the 
preoccupation with meaning with a preoccupation with the results of the natural sciences, 
analytic philosophy is not a dominant force in contemporary philosophy anymore.  Nev-
ertheless, contemporary analytic philosophy still has an important and yet unfinished task 
ahead, namely to revive and revitalize the intuitive criterion of difference and defend its es-
sential role in any adequate account of our own self-understanding, particularly as subjects 
and agents.  The revival of Frege’s constraint, that is, the recognition that differences in our 
own understanding of what we mean have an essential role in determining what we mean, 
reclaims the identity of analytic philosophy, turns to its proper tasks, and makes analytic 
philosophy relevant again to the philosophical project of understanding what it is that we 
mean when we think, speak and act.
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